Indeed this strategy faces many challenges

The debt of the private sector will continue permanently in the United States, the euro (excluding Germany), at the United Kingdom. If the private sector deleveraging continues, domestic demand in the OECD countries will remain permanently low. Their imports will remain low also (they have decreased by 30 since the beginning of the crisis) and exports to these countries. A return to growth cannot be their domestic demand and exports to other countries of the OECD. The only available strategy is to develop exports to emerging countries and exporters of first matières. These exports are now in severe decline (-25 over a year), which should worry about.

Indeed, this strategy faces many challenges. The first has to be raised: If the Interior of the countries of the OECD remains low, the only part of world trade which can restart is related to the emerging countries and exporters of oil, which represents 38 of world trade. The second difficulty is that emerging countries where domestic demand is strong more often replace domestic production to imports.

The situation in China is particularly interesting: once again very strong all components of domestic demand (increase over one year for 50 of investment in capital equipment and investment in construction, 90 of the sales of cars!), continuation of the decline in imports, fell by 17 over a year. This situation has particularly goods sold on the domestic market of emerging countries are just sophisticated and have a very low import content, the content of imports of goods exported by developing countries is very high. This implies that total exports to emerging countries are likely to remain low.

The third difficulty is that, apart the Germany and Japan, the countries of the OECD had before the crisis a very different strategy was to support their economy by intérieure demand and rising debt. This has led to a very different capacity of countries to export to the emerging countries and oil exporters. This capability is strong enough, strong Germany and the Japan (where exports to the emerging represent 9 to 12 of GDP) in Italy; low-France, United Kingdom, in Spain, in the United States (where they represent from 3 to 4 of GDP). The United States, the United Kingdom, the France, the Spain and the Italy are therefore a problem of competitiveness of their products.

Faced with a market size reduced export competitiveness (quality of the products, range...), the OECD countries will try to increase their market share in emerging markets by using a depreciation of exchange rates: very low interest rates, very rapid growth of liquidity in the United States, the United Kingdom, in the euro area and even the Japan. There is a beginning of weakening of the dollar and the weakness of the pound sterling. The Japan will not remain indifferent to the collapse of its exports due to the appreciation of the yen. But the war of the exchange rate between the countries of the OECD is now constrained by policy exchange of emerging countries and oil exporters: to avoid appreciation of their currencies against the dollar, these countries accumulate again very important reserves (which increases of 150 billion dollars a month on average). This situation is particularly linked to the return to a situation of fixed exchange rates between the yuan and the dollar in June 2008. This hinders the depreciation of the dollar, which would normally come from the applied monetary very expansionist United States and outflows of capital it.

Thus the possibility of a dual exchange rate war: on the one hand, between the countries of the OECD, to gain the market share in emerging countries; on the other hand, between the United States, on the one hand, China, the exporters of oil, on the other, this second group of countries preventing the depreciation of the dollar by its interventions by Exchange and the accumulation of reserves.